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
Potential for Pol. Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia, Thailand:

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OPR-502/2

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Research Project

The Potential for Political Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand:

Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model

Progress Report No. 2

~~Confidential~~

OPR-502/2

February 1975

Subject to General Declassification Schedule
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Progress Report No. 2

February 1975

The Potential for Political Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand: A Progress Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model

This is the second in a series of reports on the testing of an analytical model of political violence adapted from Ted Robert Gurr's frustration-aggression theory (*Why Men Rebel*, Princeton University Press, 1970). The Gurr theory is based on the proposition that political violence is the product of group frustrations reinforced by the belief that violence is justified and by the capability to turn the resulting politicized anger into collective aggression. The form of the ensuing violence—*turmoil* (riots or demonstrations), *insurgency* (terrorist acts or small-scale guerrilla operations), *conspiracy* (attempted coups), or *internal war* (large-scale revolutionary actions or civil war)—will depend upon the kinds of relationships which are found to exist among various types of groups in the country under examination. A complete description of the theory and of the procedures used to apply the model is contained in an earlier OPR report of an experimental, *ex post facto* test of the model in the Chilean situation of mid-1973 (OPR 502, Revised, November 1974).

The purpose of this second phase of the project is to test the value of the Gurr model as a technique for assessing the nature and potential for political violence in societies of varying stages of development and with quite different cultural heritages and political institutions. The three countries chosen—Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand—seem to meet our requirements: Each represents a different stage of development in a distinct geographic area, and each is confronted with domestic unrest or political conflict.

For each of the three countries, a panel of five CIA analysts assigns numerical evaluations at regular intervals to the model's key variables—relative deprivation or collective frustration, belief in the justification for violence, coercive force, and institutionalized support. The evaluations are made for each group or "actor" which, in the panel's judgment, represents a significant political force in the country. The country's actors are also assessed in terms of their identification with four basic actor-categories: Pro-regime, mass-oriented (PR-MO); pro-regime, elite-oriented (PR-EO); anti-regime, mass-oriented (AR-MO); and anti-regime, elite-oriented (AR-EO). At each point of assessment during the test period, the panel's evaluations are combined statistically, using computerized procedures devised in the Office of Political Research, to produce overall evaluations of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV) and of the conditions conducive to particular types of violence in the country under observation. The three panels' evaluations are made on a monthly schedule, and the entire test series is expected to run until mid-1975.

NOTE: Comments or questions on this project will be welcomed by its author
Office of Political Research, code 143, ext. 4091.

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The summary below presents the principal findings from the third set of assessments made by the country panels in mid-February 1975. The graphs on succeeding pages display trends based on the three sets of assessments made to date. The first was made at different times by the three panels in the period from late November through December 1974; the next two were made by all three panels around the mid-points of January and February 1975. Subsequent monthly progress reports, based in each case on mid-month evaluations, will indicate trend changes in the panels' scoring patterns. In this way, the model's projections of the potential and form of political violence can be tested against actual developments in each country during the test period.

Summary of Principal Findings

(NOTE: The data cited below and in the following graphs are keyed to each country's Potential for Political Violence or PPV, as reflected by the median PPV score of each five-member country panel. The figures should not be regarded as representing either probabilities or absolute quantities; they should be interpreted merely as indicating *relative* status or strength, compared to other variables in the model assessed by the same country panel or to corresponding variables assessed by the other two country panels.)

General:

1. In the mid-February assessments by the three country panels, Ethiopia showed by far the largest potential for violence—more than 65 percent higher than the level in either Argentina or Thailand.

2. A marked contrast in the conditions conducive to particular types of violence emerged between Ethiopia on the one hand and Argentina and Thailand on the other. While, within the limits defined by their relatively low potential for political violence, Argentina and Thailand both showed a slight tilt toward turmoil and insurgency, Ethiopia, within the limits of its much larger potential, displayed a strong tendency toward internal war and conspiracy.

3. The potential for political violence among specific types of actor groups varied along similar lines: In Argentina and Thailand, pro-regime elite actors showed the strongest potential, while in Ethiopia anti-regime elite actors displayed the largest potential.

4. The contrast between Argentina and Thailand on the one hand and Ethiopia on the other also showed up in panel assessments of the motivation and capability for political violence. Ethiopia was judged to have twice as much politicized frustration as either Argentina or Thailand, even though the coercive force and institutional support needed to turn that frustration into political violence was judged to be about the same in all three countries.

5. Following the same general pattern, the range of variation in assessments among members of the Ethiopian panel was approximately twice that of the panels for Argentina and Thailand.

Argentina:

In the period January-February 1975, the potential for political violence in Argentina showed a marked decline (a drop in PPV score from 52 to 42).

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Within limits of that reduced potential, conditions in Argentina were judged in February, as in the previous month, to be most conducive to turmoil and insurgency (each with a PPV component of 12), somewhat less to internal war (10), and least to conspiracy or an attempted coup (8). Of the four types of conditions, that for turmoil decreased the most during the period (from 17 to 12). The potential for political violence declined for all four actor categories, but the biggest drop was seen among anti-regime mass actors (15 to 9). The capability to launch and sustain political violence remained about the same (8 for coercive force, 9 for institutional support), but the degree of political frustration showed a marked decline (from 34 to 25). The variation in assessments of individual panel members widened somewhat during the period (to a range of 23 around the median PPV score of 42).

Ethiopia:


The potential for political violence in Ethiopia rose sharply in the January-February period (an increase in PPV from 62 to 73). Within limits defined by that expanded potential, conditions were judged to be most favorable for conspiracy (a relatively sharp increase from 18 in January to 23 in February), only slightly less so for internal war (an increase from 19 to 22), and least for insurgency (15) and turmoil (13). As in January, the greatest potential for political violence was found among anti-regime elite actors (28), somewhat less among anti-regime mass actors (23), and least among pro-regime elite and pro-regime mass actors (13 and 9, respectively). The largest increase in PPV from the previous month was seen among anti-regime mass actors (16 to 23). Though the capability for violence (including that obtained from external allies) remained relatively unchanged in the January-February period (a February score of 11 for both coercive force and institutional support), the level of politicized frustration in the country jumped sharply (from 42 to 51). Variation among members of the Ethiopian panel, already relatively large in January, increased even more in February (a range of 48 around the median PPV score of 73).

Thailand:

In Thailand the potential for political violence showed a slight drop during the January-February period (a decline in PPV from 47 to 44). Within the limits of that potential, the pattern of conditions conducive to particular types of political violence remained roughly the same during the period. Conditions were viewed as most favorable for insurgency (17), somewhat less for turmoil (14), and least for internal war (8) and conspiracy (5). Similarly, the degree of PPV among specific actor groups remained relatively unchanged. Pro-regime elite and anti-regime mass actors continued to show the most PPV (16 and 12, respectively), while pro-regime mass and anti-regime elite actors showed the least (both 8). Politicized frustration in the country dropped slightly during the period (from 28 to 26), while the capability to translate that frustration into political violence remained about the same (8 for coercive force, 10 for institutional support). Members of the Thai panel showed little change in variation between the January and February assessments (a range of 24 around the February median PPV score of 44).

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Conditions Conducive to Particular Types of Political Violence






Shaded areas represent, within the limits of each country's potential for political violence (PPV), the degree to which that country panel's median scores on key variables fulfill the conditions hypothesized by the Gurr theory as conducive to each type of political violence.

T - Turmoil
I - Insurgency
C - Conspiracy
IW - Internal War

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The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) for Each Type of Actor




Shaded areas represent each country panel's median scores for PPV for each actor category.

PR-MO-Pro-Regime, Mass-Oriented Actors
PR-EO- Pro-Regime, Elite-Oriented Actors
AR-MO-Anti-Regime, Mass-Oriented Actors
AR-EO- Anti-Regime, Elite-Oriented Actors

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The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) in Terms of Key Variables in the Gurr Model






Shaded areas represent sums of each country panel's median scores for each key variable for all actor categories.

IS - Institutional Support
 CF - Coercive Force
 PF - Politicized Frustration
 (relative deprivation x
 justification for violence)

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Individual Analysts' Assessments of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV)



Colored lines represent the range of individual analysts' scores for PPV around each country panel's median score for PPV.

— Analyst-A
 Analyst-B
 --- Analyst-C
 - - - Analyst-D
 Analyst-E

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